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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of deposit insurance system on the financial performance of 
Turkish commercial banks using experimental design approach. The research findings provide 
support to moral-hazard hypothesis. My findings indicate that domestic private commercial banks 
show significant increases in credit risk, foreign exchange position risk, liquidity risk, and agency 
costs relative to their benchmark after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system. I relate 
this excessive risk-taking to the moral-hazard behavior by commercial banks. The smaller commercial 
banks which are more vulnerable to moral-hazard problem experience significant increases in agency 
costs. The research results indicate that 100 percent deposit insurance system distorts the incentive 
structure of commercial banks and thus, prevent proper functioning of market discipline mechanism 
and lead to the taking excessive risk-taking.  
I also analyze the efficiency of market discipline mechanism by examining market reaction to the four 
failed banks transferred to SDIF. The research findings show that the cumulative abnormal returns of 
failed banks reflected unfavorable information 45 weeks prior to the beginning of the bank 
examination and 65 weeks prior to the transfer of the failed bank to SDIF. Thus, the hypothesis that 
market is inefficient and do not properly react to the increased potential of bankruptcy is not 
supported 
 
 
 
Keywords  : Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Abnormal  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical models suggest that deposit insurance system causes in multiparty principal-agent 
problem and generate moral-hazard behavior (Akerlof and Romer, 1993; Scott and Weingast, 1994; 
Kane, 1995; McKinnon and Pill, 1999; Kane and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2001). Moral-hazard behavior 
hypothesis implies that deposit insurance removes the constraint of market discipline mechanism over 
the bank and this allows the bank to be involved in the gambling at the taxpayers’ expense.  
In this paper, I analyze the impact of 100 percent deposit insurance on the financial performance 
of commercial banks in Turkish banking system using experimental-design approach. I also examine 
the efficiency of market discipline mechanism by analyzing the sensitivity of stock returns of failed 
banks to the potential of transfer to Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, I examine the effects of the 
introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system on the performance of Turkish banking system. 
Section III analyzes the efficiency of market discipline mechanism. Section IV discusses research 
findings, and gives a brief conclusion.  
 
II. THE IMPACT OF MORAL-HAZARD BEHAVIOR ON THE 
FINANCIAL PEROFORMANCE OF TURKISH BANKS 
 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
Bank runs occur when many or all of the bank’s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds 
simultaneously. The failure of any single bank may result in a chain reaction (domino effect) and 
eventually, all remaining banks in the system may face a greater probability of failure. Therefore, the 
failure of any single bank to meet its obligations makes the whole banking system instable and causes 
in reduced public confidence in the system as a whole. Considering huge fiscal costs due to the 
instability in the banking system, financial safety nets are erected to decrease the vulnerability of 
banking system to the contagion effects of individual bank runs. One of the main elements of these 
safety nets is deposit insurance system which covers the losses of depositors in case of the bank’s 
bankruptcy.  
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However, the introduction of deposit insurance system may result in the distorted incentive 
structure in the banking system, since it causes in the informational asymmetries among contracting 
parties. Contracting parties consist of bank, depositors, and supervisors in the environment where 
deposit insurance system doesn’t exist. In this case, depositors who benefit from the returns also bear 
the risk of loosing their deposits in case of the bank’s bankruptcy. Therefore, they exert market 
discipline mechanism over the bank by shifting their funds or adjusting their expected rates of return 
on the basis of the bank’s riskiness (Park, 1995; Park and Persistani, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2000; Baer and Brewer, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Ellis and Flannery, 1992). 
Consequently, the bank’s default risk becomes upperbounded by the constraints of market discipline 
mechanism. 
With the introduction of deposit insurance system, the number of contracting parties increases 
and consists of bank, depositors, supervisors, politicians, and taxpayers. To put it simply under deposit 
insurance system politicians promise depositors that taxpayers will pay the bill of their losses if a 
bank will not be able to meet its obligations. This type of deposit insurance design can be viewed as 
multiparty principal-agent problem and generate moral-hazard behavior (Akerlof and Romer, 1993; 
Scott and Weingast, 1994; Kane, 1995;  McKinnon and Pill, 1999; Kane and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2001). 
Moral-hazard behavior implies that distorted incentive structure in the banking system due to 
the deposit insurance will give an incentive to the banks to go broke for profit at the taxpayers’ 
expense. The depositors have no longer any reason to be concerned with the financial condition of the 
bank and therefore, they do not constitute the source of the threat for the bank. Consequently, deposit 
insurance removes depositors’ constraint over the bank and the bank may become involved in the 
gambling at the taxpayers’ expense. Moral-hazard behavior also implies that a weak and even 
insolvent bank can obtain almost unlimited fund from depositors by offering slightly higher interest 
rates on insured deposits, since insured depositors don’t care about the bank’s riskiness. Below, I 
provide a model which shows that banks tend to take higher risks under deposit insurance system.  
For every bank, two functions must be defined: the expected profit and the risk level which can 
also be understood as the likelihood of bankruptcy, denoted by E(x) and p(x), respectively. Common 
argument x is a policy variable controlled by the bank. Both E and p are either strictly increasing or 
strictly decreasing functions of x. There are fundamental tradeoff relationship between expected 
profits and risk as suggested by the market model developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).  
The bank’s main objective is to maximize expected profits. However, profits are conditional on 
the default risk upperbounded by a predetermined value p*; i.e., 
( ) ( ) ∗≤ pxptosubjectxEMax   
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Given the monotonicity of E and p, the optimal value, x*, to this problem obviously solves 
p(x)=p*. Then a question arises: how will moral hazard problem will affect the predetermined value 
of p*?  p* is initially determined by depositors’ control over banks through market discipline 
mechanism. However, since depositors loose their incentives to exert market discipline mechanism 
under deposit insurance system, p* increases and becomes solely dependent of regulatory restrictions. 
Therefore, a bank aiming to maximize E(x) are able to take more risks which also increase the 
likelihood of its bankruptcy. 
 
2.2. Turkish Banking System and Deposit Insurance 
Turkish banking system has shown considerable growth since 1980. Total bank assets have 
grown over 7.2 times in 1980-1999 period, whereas GNP has grown only 2.7 times1. The banking 
system has gained dynamic structure and played an important role in the economic development of 
Turkish economy. However, long-standing economic imbalances, especially, chronically high 
inflation, huge public sector borrowing requirements and use of generous tax credits and exemptions 
to enhance the attractiveness of public sector securities over private sector borrowing have severely 
constrained the growth of banking system. These structural imbalances combined with 100 percent 
deposit insurance system have distorted the incentive structure of Turkish banking system.  
100 percent deposit insurance was introduced in Turkey during severe domestic economic crisis 
in 1994. After announcement of the bankruptcies of some domestic commercial banks, Turkish 
authorities fearing contagion effects of these bankruptcies have viewed 100 percent deposit insurance 
a way to prevent full-scaled bank runs. 
To understand the impact of 100 percent deposit insurance on the risk attitude of banking 
system, it is useful to examine the environment around banking system in 1990s years. In this period, 
Turkish banks became heavily engaged in investing short-term government papers which offered 
abnormally high real interest rates. These investments have been primarily financed by deposit growth 
and foreign borrowing. The introduction of full insurance coverage of deposits under 100 percent 
deposit insurance system made it easier to raise deposits regardless of the bank’s riskiness. Low 
quality banks became engaged in practices of charging extra-high deposit rates and lending to over-
risky projects in hope to grow out of their liquidity and solvency problems (Worldbank, 2000).  This 
excessive risk taking increased default risk of the whole banking system. In order to maintain 
confidence in the banking system and prevent systemic risk, from 1997 to July 2002, the ownership of 
the twenty banks was transferred to the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). The direct fiscal 
                                                 
1 Calculations are made on data from Banks Association of Turkey. 
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burden of these transfers on economy has exceeded total 15 billions USD2. Moreover, banking crisis 
has caused in the loss of confidence to domestic financial markets and economy has faced the 
devastating effects of economic crisis in 2000-2001 years. Recognizing adverse effects of 100 percent 
deposit insurance system on the performance of banking system, a plan for gradual reduction of full 
deposit insurance was put into operation in June 2000. 
 
2.3. Sample and Data 
In this section, I collect financial data of banks operating in Turkey. Table 2 details the 
specification of banks operating in Turkish banking system.  
Table 2: Sample 
Bank Specification Number 
of Cases 
Development and Investment Banks 18 
Commercial Banks, of which 61 
 Foreign-owned Banks 18 
 Domestic-owned Banks, of which 43 
  State Banks 4 
  Private Banks, of which 39 
   Larger Banks, of which 12 
    Transferred to SDIF* 2 
   Smaller Banks, of which 27 
    Transferred to SDIF* 14 
 
Source: Banking Association of Turkey (31.12.2000) 
Since there isn’t financial statements data of three banks (Anadolubank, Denizbank and EGS 
Bank) for pre-1994 period, I exclude them from the analyses. Therefore, total number of domestic-
owned private commercial banks analysis is reduced to total 36. The source of the financial data used 
in this section is Banking Association of Turkey. 
 
                                                 
2 Calculations are made on data from Bank Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey. 
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2.4. Research Design 
 
2.4.1. Research Model and Testable Predictions  
The theoretical framework in the previous section states that 100 percent explicit deposit 
insurance in Turkish banking system may have had adverse effects on market discipline mechanism 
and led to the moral hazard problem. The moral hazard problem leads to the excessive risk-taking by 
commercial banks and erosion of bank sources. In this section, I test the hypotheses that moral hazard 
problem results in 
(1) decrease in capital adequacy, 
(2) increase in credit risk, 
(3) increase in foreign exchange risk, 
(4) increase in liquidity risk, 
(5) higher interest rates for deposits, 
(6) increase in agency costs.  
Special attention should be paid to the hypothesis about the liquidity of the banks subject to the moral-
hazard behavior. Commercial banks exposed to moral-hazard behavior are expected to reduce their 
liquidity for investing in profitable assets in order to gain higher rates of returns. However, the most 
attractive investment option was treasure bills and government bonds in 1990s years in Turkey. Since 
the liquidity variable used in this study incorporates investments on these securities, I hypothesize that 
moral-hazard behavior may result in the increases in the liquidity of commercial banks. The increases 
in the liquidity cause in huge losses when financing costs of these investments exceed their rates of 
returns. 
In addition to the above-stated hypotheses, I also expect that increased risk-taking behavior will also 
lead to the increased profitability of banks. Table 1 presents my testable predictions and empirical 
proxies.  
7 
 
Table 1: Summary of Testable Predictions 
This table details the economic characteristics I examine for changes after introduction of 100 percent deposit 
insurance system. I also present and define the empirical proxies employed in the analyses. The index symbols POST 
and PRE in the predicted relationship column stand for post 100 percent deposit insurance system and pre 100 percent 
deposit insurance system, respectively.  
Variable Proxies Predicted 
Relationships 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Standard Capital Ratio (SCR) = Capital Base / (Risk-weighted Assets, Non-cash 
Credits and Liabilities) 
SCRpost<SCRpre 
Credit Risk Non Performing Loans / Total Loans    (NCR) NCRpost>NCRpre 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Position Risk 
(Foreign Ex. Liabilities – Foreign   Exch. Assets) /  Shareholders' Equity  (FXP) FXPpost>FXPpre 
Liquidity Risk Liquid Assets/(Deposits + Non-deposit Funds)    (LIQ) LIQpost>LIQpre 
Profitability Income Before Tax / Average Total Assets    (INC) INCpost >INCpre 
Interest Cost Interest Expenses/Average Non-Profitable Assets    (INT) IEApost>IEApre 
(Salaries and Employee Benefits + Reserve for Retirement) / Total Assets (SAL) SALpost>SALpre 
Agency Cost 
Operational Expenses/Total Assets    (OPX) OPXpost>OPXpre 
 
2.4.2. Performance Benchmark  
The measurement of the role of moral-hazard behavior on the financial performance changes of 
banks is a complex task, since it is obviously impossible to trace all of the financial performance 
changes after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system to the moral hazard problem. 
Many other factors may affect financial performance changes as well. Therefore, I adopt two-staged 
experimental design approach and compare the post-1994 financial performance data of banks with 
the pre-1994 benchmark using raw and industry-adjusted variable values. I use 1994 year as the 
turning point since 100 percent deposit insurance was introduced in this year. 
The establishment of correct performance benchmark requires the identification of banks 
vulnerable to the 100 percent deposit insurance system.  State banks are always under the shield of the 
100 percent deposit insurance due to their nature. Therefore, the introduction of 100 percent deposit 
insurance is not expected to affect their financial performances significantly. Foreign-owned banks 
are not subject to the deposit insurance regulations as well and therefore, moral-hazard behavior is not 
expected from these banks. Since deposit insurance is related with the deposits, development and 
investment banks are not also expected to show moral-hazard behavior. Consequently, it is domestic 
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private commercial banks that are vulnerable to moral-hazard behavior. Considering this 
vulnerability, I analyze the financial performance data of domestic private commercial banks in both 
of the analysis stages.  
In the first stage, I compare the post-1994 financial performance data of domestic private 
commercial banks with the pre-1994 benchmark to measure the change in the performance. Some of 
the adverse changes in the financial performance of post-1994 period can be attributed to the moral-
hazard behavior; however, economy- and industry-wide factors also have much effect on these 
changes. Therefore, the financial performance changes in this analysis will reflect aggregate effects of 
the moral-hazard behavior, economy- and industry-wide factors. 
In order to eliminate the effects of economy- and industry-wide factors on the financial 
performance changes and get purified effects of moral-hazard behavior on performance changes, I go 
to the second stage and use industry-adjusted performance measures of all domestic private 
commercial banks. Industry-adjusted performance of domestic private commercial banks is calculated 
by subtracting the median of state commercial banks from the sample bank value for each year and 
bank. Industry-adjusted values will eliminate the effects of economy- and industry-wide factors on the 
financial performance changes and reflect the effects of moral-hazard behavior on the banks’ 
performance.  
 
2.4.3. Subsample Analysis 
The degree of vulnerability of domestic private commercial banks to moral-hazard behavior 
may differ according their size. Larger commercial banks are often unwilling to engage in moral-
hazard practices and are more concerned with the long-term viability of their banks, whereas smaller 
banks are more inclined to take excessive risks to make higher profits. Therefore, smaller domestic 
private commercial banks (SDPCB) can be considered as a special subsample that is more inclined to 
show moral-hazard behavior. This hypothesis is partially supported by the recent evidence from the 
Turkish banking system: Sixteen banks out of total twenty banks transferred to SDIF pertained to 
SDPCB subsample3. 
In the subsample analysis, I consider the heterogeneity of domestic private commercial banks in 
terms of their vulnerability to moral-hazard behavior and measure industry-adjusted performance 
changes of SDPCB subsample. The study of industry-adjusted financial performance changes of 
                                                 
3 In this paper, I use total asset size to classify banks as smaller or larger. If the ratio of total assets of the bank to total assets 
of the whole banking system does not exceed 1%, the bank is considered as smaller bank, otherwise as larger bank.  
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SDPCB subsample will make it possible to see the extent of moral-hazard behavior. Industry-adjusted 
performance of small-scaled domestic private commercial banks is calculated by subtracting the 
median of larger private commercial banks median from the sample bank value for each year and 
bank. 
 
2.4.4. Research Methodology 
To test the research predictions, I first compute empirical proxies for every bank for a twelve-
year period: six years before (1988-1993) through six years after (1995-2000) introduction of 100 
percent deposit insurance system. I then calculate the median of each variable for each bank over 
1988-1993 and 1995-2000 windows. 1994 year is excluded from the analysis since the variable values 
for this year bear crossing effects of the existence and non-existence of 100 percent deposit insurance 
system.  
Having computed pre- and post-1994 medians, I use the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test as my principal method of testing for significant changes in the variables. Since financial ratios do 
not follow normal distribution, the interpretation of the findings of parametric analysis becomes 
difficult. The small sample sizes also lead to the selection of nonparametric tests as a suitable method 
of testing financial performance changes. 
I base my conclusions on the standardized test statistic Z, which for samples of at least 10 
follows approximately a standard normal distribution. In addition to the Wilcoxon test, I use a 
(binomial) proportion test to determine whether the proportion (p) of banks experiencing changes in a 
given direction is greater than would be expected by chance (typically testing whether p = 0.5). The 
finding that an overwhelming proportion of banks changed performance in the same direction may be 
at least as informative as a finding concerning the median change in performance. 
 
2.5. Empirical Results  
In this section I present and discuss my empirical results for the two stages of the analysis and 
one subsample. I first present and discuss my empirical results (in Table 3 and 4) for the raw and 
industry-adjusted values of domestic private commercial banks. Then I present and discuss (in Table 
5) my results for the industry-adjusted values of smaller domestic private commercial banks 
subsample. For each of these analysis stages, I examine and report (in the text and in Tables 3 to 5) 
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whether banks experience significant changes in the variable values after introduction of 100 percent 
deposit insurance.  
 
2.5.1. Full Sample Analysis  
 
2.5.1.1. Capital Adequacy 
Standard capital ratio of domestic private commercial banks has increased on average (median) 
3 percentage points (4 percent) after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system and 80 
percent of all banks experienced increasing standard capital ratio (Table 3). The Wilcoxon and 
proportion test statistics are significant at 5 percent level. However, industry-adjusted values of 
domestic private commercial banks do not show significant changes after introduction of 100 percent 
deposit insurance system (Table 4).  
Therefore, the significant increases in capital adequacy of commercial banks are due to the 
economy and industry-wide effects rather than moral-hazard behavior. After 1994 banking crisis, 
banks in Turkey are required to maintain 8 percent minimum capital adequacy ratio and report their 
capital adequacy position quarterly. This restriction has prevented further declines in the capital 
adequacy of commercial banks. 
 
2.5.1.2. Credit Risk 
The credit risk of domestic private commercial banks measured by non-performing loans/total 
loans ratio (NCR) doesn’t show significant changes after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance 
system (Table 3). However, the industry-adjusted NCR ratio increases on average (median) 8.5 
percentage points (2.9 percent) and 78 percent of all domestic private commercial banks experience 
increasing variable values. The proportion and Wilcoxon test statistics are significant at 1 percent 
level (Table 4).  
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Table 3 
The Analysis of Financial Performance Changes After Introduction of 100 percent Deposit Insurance System in 1994:   
Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Domestic Private Commercial Banks 
This table presents empirical results for the domestic private commercial banks. For each empirical proxy I give the number of usable observation, the mean and median 
values, standard deviation of the proxy for the six-year periods prior and subsequent to introduction of deposit insurance, the mean and median change in the proxy’s value for 
post-1994 period versus pre-1994 period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose proxy values 
change as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. 
Variables N (Median) 
Pre-1994 
Mean  
Pre-1994 
Standard 
Deviation 
Post-1994 
Mean  
(Median) 
Post-1994 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
1994) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z-Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Capital Adequacy     
Standard Capital Ratio (SCP)         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
20 0.11
(0.09) 
0.07 0.14
(0.13) 
0.07 0.03
(0.04) 
2.44** 0.20 2.46**
Credit Risk 
Non Performing Loans / Total Loans 
 (NCR) 
36 0.04
(0.01) 
0.07 0.11
(0.02) 
0.33 0.07
(0.01) 
1.54 0.64 1.83*
Foreign Exchange Position Risk 
(Foreign Ex. Liabilities – Foreign  
 Exch. Assets) /  Shareholders' Equity 
 (FXP) 
36 1.13
(0.77) 
1.08 1.75
(1.32) 
1.86 0.62
(0.55) 
2.89*** 0.75 3.17***
Liquidity Risk 
Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-
 deposit Funds)  (LIQ) 
36 1.00
(0.61) 
2.25 0.54
(0.52) 
0.21 -0.46
(-0.09) 
2.33** 0.67 2.17**
Profitability
Income Before Tax / Average Total 
 Assets   (INC) 
36 0.06
(0.05) 
0.04 0.07
(0.07) 
0.05 0.01
(0.02) 
1.60 0.64 1.83*
Interest Cost 
Interest Expenses/Average Non-
 Profitable Assets   (INT) 
36 0.21
(0.21) 
0.11 0.25
(0.22) 
0.11 0.04
(0.01) 
2.34** 0.67 2.17**
Agency Cost 
(Salaries and Employee Benefits + 
 Reserve for Retirement) / Total 
 Assets   (SAL) 
36 0.026
(0.025) 
0.015 0.025
(0.023) 
0.014 -0.001
(-0.002) 
1.90* 0.28 2.50**
Operational Expenses/Total Assets  
 (OPX) 
36 0.032
(0.031) 
0.016 0.033
(0.030) 
0.019 0.001
(-0.001) 
1.51 0.31 2.17**
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test.  
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Table 4 
The Analysis of Financial Performance Changes After Introduction of 100 percent Deposit Insurance System in 1994:   
Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Industry-Adjusted Values of Domestic Private Commercial Banks 
This table presents empirical results for the industry-adjusted values of domestic private commercial banks. For each empirical proxy I give the number of usable observation, 
the mean and median values, standard deviation of the proxy for the six-year periods prior and subsequent to introduction of deposit insurance, the mean and median change in 
the proxy’s value for post-1994 period versus pre-1994 period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms 
whose proxy values change as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. 
Variables N (Median) 
Pre-1994 
Mean  
Pre-1994 
Standard 
Deviation 
Post-1994 
Mean  
(Median) 
Post-1994 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
1994) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z-Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Capital Adequacy     
Standard Capital Ratio (SCP)         
        
         
       
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
      
         
         
20 0.034
(0.012) 
0.070 0.026
(0.011) 
0.072 -0.008
(-0.001) 
 
1.08 0.60 0.67
Credit Risk 
Non Performing Loans / Total Loans 
 (NCR) 
36 -0.019
(-0.046) 
 
0.071 0.066
(-0.017) 
 
0.328 0.085
(0.029) 
3.05*** 0.78 3.50***
Foreign Exchange Position Risk 
(Foreign Ex. Liabilities – Foreign  
 Exch. Assets) /  Shareholders' Equity 
 (FXP) 
36 0.786
(0.428) 
1.081 1.465
(1.032) 
1.862 0.679
(0.604) 
3.16*** 0.78 3.50***
Liquidity Risk 
Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-
 deposit Funds)  (LIQ) 
36 0.528
(0.137) 
2.258 0.258
(0.234) 
0.212 -0.270
(0.097) 
2.50** 0.25 3.17***
Profitability
Income Before Tax / Average Total 
 Assets   (INC) 
36 0.041
(0.031) 
0.039 0.058
(0.050) 
0.051 0.017
(0.019) 
1.73* 0.64 1.83*
Interest Cost 
Interest Expenses/Average Non-
 Profitable Assets   (INT) 
36 -0.071
(-0.072) 
 
0.112 -0.087
(-0.117) 
 
0.113 -0.016
(-0.045) 
 
1.49 0.47 0.50
Agency Cost 
(Salaries and Employee Benefits + 
 Reserve for Retirement) / Total 
 Assets   (SAL) 
36 -0.005
(-0.007) 
0.015 0.007
(0.004) 
0.014 0.012
(0.011) 
4.24*** 0.81 3.83***
Operational Expenses/Total Assets  
 (OPX) 
36 -0.001
(-0.004) 
0.016 0.013
(0.010) 
0.019 0.014
(0.014) 
4.43*** 0.83 4.17***
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test.  
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Table 5 
The Analysis of Financial Performance Changes After Introduction of 100 percent Deposit Insurance System in 1994:   
Summary of Results from Tests of Predictions for the Industry-Adjusted Values of Smaller Domestic Private Commercial Banks Subsample 
This table presents empirical results for the industry-adjusted values of smaller domestic private commercial banks subsample. For each empirical proxy I give the number of 
usable observation, the mean and median values, standard deviation of the proxy for the six-year periods prior and subsequent to introduction of deposit insurance, the mean 
and median change in the proxy’s value for post-1994 period versus pre-1994 period, and a test of significance of the change in median values. The final two columns detail 
the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as predicted, as well as a test of significance of this change. 
Variables N (Median) 
Pre-1994 
Mean  
Pre-1994 
Standard 
Deviation 
Post-1994 
Mean  
(Median) 
Post-1994 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Change 
(Median) 
Z-Statistics for 
Difference in 
Medians 
(Pre- and post- 
1994) 
Percentage of 
Firms that 
Changed as 
Predicted 
Z-Statistics for 
Significance of 
Proportion 
Change 
Capital Adequacy     
Standard Capital Ratio (SCP)         
      
         
        
         
         
         
          
         
      
         
         
         
         
14 0.009
(-0.015) 
 
0.079 -0.008
(-0.028) 
 
0.068 -0.017
(-0.013) 
 
1.51 0.64 1.34
Credit Risk 
Non Performing Loans / Total Loans 
 (NCR) 
24 0.032
(-0.003) 
 
0.085 0.056
(0.017) 
0.134 0.024
(0.020) 
0.74 0.63 1.43
Foreign Exchange Position Risk 
(Foreign Ex. Liabilities – Foreign  
 Exch. Assets) /  Shareholders' Equity 
 (FXP) 
24 0.453
(0.083) 
1.222 0.621
(-0.266) 
2.196 0.168
(-0.349) 
0.94 0.29 2.25**
Liquidity Risk 
Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-
 deposit Funds)  (LIQ) 
24 0.630
(0.061) 
2.760 0.023
(-0.026) 
0.230 -0.607
(-0.087) 
0.91 0.58 1.02
Profitability
Income Before Tax / Average Total 
 Assets   (INC) 
24 0.003
(-0.009) 
 
0.038 -0.040
(-0.056) 
 
0.056 -0.043
(-0.047) 
 
2.94*** 0.29 2.25**
Interest Cost 
Interest Expenses/Average Non-
 Profitable Assets   (INT) 
24 0.060
(0.054) 
0.130 0.084
(0.080) 
0.122 0.024
(0.026) 
0.74 0.58 1.02
Agency Cost 
(Salaries and Employee Benefits + 
 Reserve for Retirement) / Total 
 Assets   (SAL) 
24 0.003
(0.001) 
0.017 0.011
(0.008) 
0.015 0.008
(0.007) 
2.37** 0.79 3.06***
Operational Expenses/Total Assets  
 (OPX) 
24 0.002
(-0.001) 
0.018 0.015
(0.012) 
0.021 0.013
(0.013) 
2.71*** 0.75 2.65***
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test.  
 
 
14 
The significant changes in the industry-adjusted values can be attributed to the moral-hazard 
behavior, since by definition they are purified from sectoral trends. These results conform to the 
research predictions. Banks vulnerable to moral-hazard behavior tends to lend recklessly to overrisky 
projects when they feel themselves free of the restraints imposed by depositors using market discipline 
mechanism. Though, low propensity of Turkish commercial banks to lend to manufacturing industries 
(due to abnormally high real interest rates gained by investing government securities) limit the banks’ 
exposure to the default risk of borrowers, the increased credit risk due to moral-hazard behavior 
constituted problems for individual banks following aggressive growth strategies.  
 
2.5.1.3. Foreign Exchange Position Risk 
McKinnon and Pill (1999) shows that deposit insurance system provides incentive to banks to 
increase foreign borrowing and incur foreign exchange risk. The research findings of the current study 
approve these insights. FXP ratio which is the measure of foreign exchange position risk increases on 
average (median) 62 percentage points (55 percent) and 75 percent of all domestic private commercial 
banks experience increasing FXP ratio after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system 
(Table 3). The Wilcoxon and proportion test statistics are significant at 1 percent level. Moreover, the 
industry-adjusted value of FXP on average (median) increase 68 percentage points (60 percent) and 78 
percent of all domestic private commercial banks experience increasing industry-adjusted FXP ratio 
after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system (Table 4). The Wilcoxon and proportion 
test statistics are significant at 1 percent level again.  
The results show that increasing foreign exchange risks of banks can be attributed to the 
introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system, since the changes in the foreign exchange 
position remains significant even after controlling for economy and industry-wide effects. These 
results could be interpreted as a support to the moral-hazard behavior hypothesis. Banks facing less 
pressure from the depositors are willing to incur large open foreign-exchange positions. Considering 
the appeal of high interest rate premiums on government debt securities in recent period, banks 
became heavily engaged in the overinvestment in government paper and opening their foreign-
exchange position. However, this strategy has been one of the reasons of the financial crisis, when 
domestic currency depreciation has far exceeded the interest rate premiums in 2000-2001 years. 
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2.5.1.4. Liquidity Risk 
The research findings show that the liquidity (measured by LIQ ratio) of domestic private 
commercial banks decreases after the introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system. LIQ ratio 
has decreased on average (median) 46 percentage points (9 percent) after introduction of 100 percent 
deposit insurance system and 67 percent of all banks experienced decreasing liquidity (Table 3). The 
Wilcoxon and proportion test statistics are significant at 5 percent level. However, industry-adjusted 
LIQ ratio values of domestic private commercial banks show significant increases after introduction of 
100 percent deposit insurance system. Industry-adjusted LIQ ratio values on median increase by 10 
percentage points and 75 percent of all firms experience increasing liquidity. The Wilcoxon and 
proportional test statistics are significant at 5 percent level. These results imply that though, sectoral 
trend is towards decreasing liquidity, the moral-hazard behavior encourages higher liquidity for 
domestic private commercial banks. 
 
2.5.1.5. Profitability 
The simple market model suggests that expected risk premium varies in direct proportion of its 
risk. Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize higher profitability for banks vulnerable to moral-
hazard behavior.  
The examination of raw variable value show that INC ratio does not experience significant 
changes after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system according to Wilcoxon test 
statistics. However, proportion test statistics is significant and 64 percent of all domestic private 
commercial banks experience increasing profitability. There are increasing pattern in the profitability 
measure of industry-adjusted values of domestic private commercial banks. Industry-adjusted values 
of INC ratio of domestic private commercial banks has increased on average (median) 1.7 percentage 
points (1.9 percent) after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system and 64 percent of all 
banks experienced increasing profitability (Table 3). The Wilcoxon and proportion test statistics are 
significant at 10 percent level.  
These results indicate that commercial banks gained higher profits by taking excessive risks. 
This increasing profitability is the reward of the moral-hazard behavior, since the changes in the 
industry-adjusted values are controlled for economy and industry-wide effects 
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2.5.1.6. Interest Cost  
The raw values of INT ratio of domestic private commercial banks do not show significant 
changes after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system. However, there are significant 
changes in industry-adjusted values of INT ratio. INT ratio has increased on average (median) 4 
percentage points (1 percent) after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system and 67 
percent of all banks experienced increasing interest cost (Table 3). The Wilcoxon and proportion test 
statistics are significant at 5 percent level. The results imply that moral-hazard behavior encourages 
banks to offer higher interest rates to depositors on insured deposits. 
 
2.5.1.7. Agency Cost  
Moral-hazard behavior is predicted to increase the agency cost of the commercial banks. 
Agency cost is measured by two variables in this study: First variable is the (Salaries and Employee 
Benefits + Reserve for Retirement) / Total Assets (SAL) ratio and second variable is the ratio of 
operational expenses to total assets (OPX).  
The raw values of agency cost variables show significant changes after introduction of 100 
percent deposit insurance system. SAL ratio has decreased on average (median) 0.1 percentage points 
(0.2 percent) after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system and 72 percent of all banks 
experienced increasing interest cost (Table 3). The Wilcoxon test statistics is significant at 10, and 
proportion test statistics is significant at 5 percent level. The proportion test statistics for OPX variable 
is also significant at 5 percent level; however, Wilcoxon test statistics is not significant at the 
conventional levels.  
Though, the industry-adjusted values of agency cost variables show significant increasing trend. 
SAL ratio has increased on average (median) 1.2 percentage points (1.1 percent) after introduction of 
100 percent deposit insurance system and 81 percent of all banks experienced increasing SAL ratio 
(Table 3). The Wilcoxon and proportion test statistics are significant at 1 percent level. The industry-
adjusted values of OPX variable experience similar pattern: OPX ratio has increased on average 
(median) 1.4 percentage points (1.4 percent) after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance 
system and 83 percent of all banks experienced increasing OPX ratio (Table 4). 
These results indicate that the moral-hazard behavior induces increasing agency costs in 
commercial banks. These results are in the same line with research predictions.  
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2.5.2. Subsample Analysis  
The subsample analysis of SDPCB subsample shows that smaller commercial banks experience 
significant changes only in profitability and agency costs. The industry-adjusted values of profitability 
measure (INC ratio) has decreased on average (median) 4.3 percentage points (4.7 percent) after 
introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system and 71 percent of all banks experienced 
decreasing INC ratio (Table 5). The Wilcoxon test statistics is significant at 1 percent level and 
proportion test statistics is significant at 5 percent level. The declining profitability of smaller 
commercial banks may be due to the adverse effects of excessive risk-taking. When economic 
conditions worsen, excessive risk taking deteriorates the profitability of smaller banks. 
SDCPB subsample also experience increasing agency costs. The industry-adjusted values of 
SAL ratio has increased on average (median) 0.8 percentage points (0.7 percent) after introduction of 
100 percent deposit insurance system and 79 percent of all banks experienced increasing SAL ratio. 
The Wilcoxon and proportion test statistics are significant at 5 percent level. The industry-adjusted 
values of OPX variable experience similar pattern: OPX ratio has increased on average (median) 1.3 
percentage points (1.3 percent) after introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance system and 75 
percent of all banks experienced increasing OPX ratio (Table 4).  
Summarizing the results for SDCPB subsample, I do not find any evidence that smaller 
commercial banks take more risks than larger ones. Though, there are significantly higher operational 
expenses and salaries, this fact may be attributed to the size factor, rather than moral-hazard behavior. 
 
III. THE EFFICIENCY OF MARKET DISCIPLINE MECHANISM  
The moral-hazard behavior hypothesis rests on the assumption of existence of market discipline 
mechanism in the absence of deposit insurance. In the other words, moral-hazard behavior occurs 
under deposit insurance system, since depositors loose their incentives to exert their pressures over 
banks through market discipline mechanism. Market discipline mechanism is reflected in the 
depositors’ withdrawal of their deposits or asking for higher rates of returns if there is an increase in 
the bank’s riskiness. 
However, is the market discipline mechanism real and works properly in emerging markets such 
as Turkey? Since the efficiency of market discipline mechanism is dependent of the informational 
efficiency of the financial markets, this question is highly interrelated with the market efficiency level 
of financial markets in the country. If the markets are efficient, then banks will be subject to the 
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market’s control and their default risk will be restrained by the market discipline. However, it is often 
argued that thinly traded financial markets in the emerging economies lack even weak-form 
efficiency.  
In this section, I will study the efficiency of market discipline mechanism by examining the 
returns on bank equities which are transferred to SDIF to determine if these returns are sensitive to the 
potential of transfer. If the market rates of returns are sensitive to the increased transfer threat, it will 
be possible to claim that market is able to exert market discipline mechanism by selling the shares of 
the overrisky banks. Considering close links of stock market attendants and depositors, it will be also 
possible to suggest that if 100 percent deposit insurance system hasn’t weakened market discipline 
mechanism, then depositors would be able to exert similar market discipline mechanism by 
withdrawing their deposits from banks or asking for higher rates of returns. 
For the analysis purposes, I collect a sample of banks transferred to SDIF over the period 1995-
2001. The primary database consists of 20 failed banks. From this database, I select the banks whose 
shares was actively traded in Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). This selection criterion reduces my 
initial sample to 4 banks. These banks are Esbank, Yasarbank, Demirbank, and Toprakbank. The 
source of the market data used in this study is Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
 
3.1. Research Methodology 
The information content of any event is measured as the abnormal common stock return relative 
to the aggregate market return. To measure the sensitivity of the stock returns to increased potential of 
transfer to SDIF, I use the methodology of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) modified by Pettway 
(1980) to remove any industry effect. My estimates on the market reaction to the potential of transfer 
of bank to SDIF are based on the market model prediction errors. Since calculation of the expected 
returns using failed bank’s market estimates do not reflect changes in the risk perceptions and industry 
effects, I calculate expected returns using returns on benchmark portfolio of nonfailed banks. This 
method will differentiate the pattern of share prices of failed banks from the pattern of share prices of 
nonfailed banks. 
In this section, I construct equally-weighted benchmark portfolio of the stocks of nonfailed 
banks using six commercial banks4 whose shares are actively traded in Istanbul Stock Exchange and 
                                                 
4 There are ten non-failed commercial banks whose shares are actively traded in ISE. Since four of them do not have 
continuous data over estimation period, my benchmark portfolio is restricted to the stocks of six commercial banks. These 
stocks are Akbank,  Disbank, Finansbank, Garanti Bankasi, Is Bankasi (C Shares), Yapi Kredi Bankasi..  
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have continuous data over estimation period. Weekly returns on the portfolio are calculated on the 
Thursday’s closing price. I calculate market parameters using market model as in (1) 
tptmpptp uRR ,,, ~
~ˆˆ~ ++= βα     [1] 
where 
  tpR ,~   = weekly market return of the benchmark portfolio on week t which is  
   measured by summing Thursday’s close price of the equally-weighted  
   portfolio plus dividends per share within the week, divided by the close price 
   of the previous week.   
    = market model estimates  pp βα ˆ,ˆ
~  tmR ,   = return on ISE-100 market portfolio on week t 
There are two specific dates related with the transfer of the bank to the SDIF. These are the 
beginning date of the examination which led to the classification on the problem bank list and the date 
of the transfer of the bank to the SDIF. The time length between the beginning date of the examination 
and transfer of the bank to the SDIF varies substantially: it is less than month for Demirbank, whereas 
it took nearly forty-six month for Yasarbank.  
Since these dates are of special-interest, I calculated market estimates of pαˆ  and  for each 
bank over the period of - 100 weeks to + 50 weeks relative to the beginning date of the examination 
and -150 weeks to 0 weeks relative to the transfer of the bank to SDIF. The specific dates, estimation 
periods, and estimated parameters are provided in Table 6.  
pβˆ
Table 6 
The Market Model Estimates  
 
Banks Yasarbank Esbank Demirbank Toprakbank 
The Month of the 
beginning of the 
examination which led to 
transfer to SDIF 02/1995 08/1995 11/ 2000 12/2000 
Estimating Period 04/02/93 – 01/02/96 05/08/93 – 25/07/96 12/11/98  - 30/11/00 26/11/98 – 29/01/01 
pαˆ  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
pβˆ  0.74 0.74 0.68 0.70 
2R  0.65 0.66 0.72 0.75 
Date of the announcement 
of transfer to SDIF 22/12/1999 22/12/1999 06/12/2000 30/11/2001 
Estimating Period 28/11/96 – 16/12/99 28/11/96 – 16/12/99 06/11/97 - 30/11/00 26/11/98 – 29/11/01 
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pαˆ  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
pβˆ  0.71 0.71 0.74 0.70 
2R  0.79 0.79 0.81 0.75 
Expected return of the nonfailed bank portfolio can be calculated using (2) below. 
tmpptp RR ,, ˆˆˆ βα +=     [2] 
where 
    = expected rate of return on the nonfailed bank portfolio. tpR ,ˆ
    = market model estimates  pp βα ˆ,ˆ
~  tmR ,   = return on ISE-100 market portfolio on week t 
Under the assumption of multivariate normality, the abnormal returns (market model prediction 
errors) to bank i on week t can be written as 
tptiti RRAR ,,, ˆ
~ −=      [3] 
where 
  tiR ,~  = market return of the security i on week t, which is measured by summing close price 
  at the end of the week plus dividends per share within the week, divided by the close 
  price of the previous week.   
   = expected rate of return on the benchmark portfolio of nonfailed banks.  tpR ,ˆ
Then I calculate the average abnormal returns by using formula (4) and cumulating these 
average abnormal returns using formula (5) below. 
      [4] ∑
=
=
n
i
tit nARAAR
1
, /
∑
=
=
T
t
tT AARCAR
1
     [5] 
where 
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   = average abnormal return on week t, over n failed banks. tAAR
   = cumulative abnormal returns at time T. TCAR
After calculating cumulative abnormal returns over the period of - 100 weeks to + 50 weeks 
relative to the beginning date of the examination and -150 weeks to 0 weeks relative to the transfer of 
the bank to SDIF, I plot and examine them to find out whether there is any information impact on the 
failed banks’ abnormal returns. If markets are efficient, I predict that there will be differences in the 
perceived risk between the failed and nonfailed banks, and the market will adjust prices to reflect the 
increased potential of transfer to SDIF. 
 
3.2. Research Findings 
In this section, I first examine cumulative abnormal returns around the beginning date of the 
examination. Then I examine the cumulative abnormal returns around the transfer date of the bank to 
SDIF.  
3.2.1. The Beginning Date of Bank Examination  
The examination of cumulative abnormal returns around the beginning date of the examination 
shows there are random trend around zero for the first 17 weeks (Figure 1).  Though it starts to decline 
from the week -75, it doesn’t represent information effect, since recovers in the subsequent weeks. It 
is apparent that information impact starts on the week – 45. The cumulative abnormal returns 
continually decline after this week and never recover again. It means that there was a difference in the 
perceived risk between the failed and nonfailed banks and the market was adjusting prices to reflect 
potential transfer of these banks to SDIF. 
 
3.2.2. The Transfer Date to SDIF 
The cumulative abnormal returns trend around zero for the first 15 weeks (Figure 2). Though, 
there are nonzero declining trend between week -135 and -68 relative to the date of announcement of 
the transfer of the failed bank to SDIF, this trend is erratic and unpredictable. Apparently, unfavorable 
information arrives at the market on week -65. The cumulative abnormal returns become more and 
more negative. It means that market are aware of the increased bankruptcy riskiness of the banks and 
starts to respond it more than one year prior to the announcement of the transfer of the failed bank to 
SDIF. 
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FIGURE 1
Cumulative abnormal returns for the period around the date of starting of the examination which led to the transfer of the 
bank to SDIF.
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FIGURE 2
Cumulative abnormal returns for the period around the date of transfer of the bank to SDIF.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides empirical analysis of the effects of deposit insurance system on the 
financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. For this purpose, I analyzed the financial 
statements of 36 private commercial banks exploiting experimental-design approach. The industry-
adjusted variable values are used in the experimental design approach to remove the effects of 
economy- and industry-wide factors on financial performance changes. 
The research findings provide support to moral-hazard behavior hypothesis. My findings 
indicate that domestic private commercial banks show significant increases in credit risk, foreign 
exchange position risk, liquidity risk, and agency costs relative to their benchmark after introduction 
of 100 percent deposit insurance system. I relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral-hazard 
behavior by commercial banks. The research results indicate that 100 percent deposit insurance 
system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevent proper functioning of 
market discipline mechanism and lead to the taking excessive risk-taking. 
Surprisingly, smaller commercial banks which are hypothesized to be more vulnerable to moral-
hazard hypothesis do not show significantly different patterns than larger banks. This result implies 
that smaller and larger commercial banks have been affected by moral-hazard problem in the similar 
way.  
I also analyze the efficiency of market discipline mechanism. For this purpose, I analyze market 
reaction to the four failed banks transferred to SDIF. The research findings show that the cumulative 
abnormal returns of failed banks reflected unfavorable information 45 weeks prior to the beginning of 
the bank examination and 65 weeks prior to the transfer of the failed bank to SDIF. Thus, the 
hypothesis that market is inefficient and do not properly react to the increased potential of bankruptcy 
is not supported. The research findings suggests that due to the close links between money and stock 
markets, if deposit insurance system haven’t weakened the market discipline mechanism, then 
depositors would have adjusted their reactions properly. Surely, this reaction would have impeded the 
adverse effects of the moral-hazard behavior on the financial performance of Turkish banking system.     
The research findings should be interpreted carefully. Though, it stresses that the market 
discipline mechanism is essential for the proper-functioning banking, it doesn’t claim for the fully 
abolishment of deposit insurance system. Since deposit insurance system hampers contagion effects of 
the individual bank runs, the optimal solution for this problem should be based on three pillars:  
(1) Not much distorting the functioning of market discipline mechanism 
(2) Preventing contagion effects of the individual bank-runs 
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(3) Conducting stronger supervision to compensate for distorted market discipline mechanism. 
To compromise first and second pillars, optimal partial deposit insurance system can be 
designed to prevent sudden outflows of funds and do not much obstruct the proper functioning of 
market discipline mechanism.  
Third pillar requires higher transparency and deterrency. Bank regulators may rate the banks 
according their financial strength and publish it regularly. Then banks will be required to contribute to 
the SDIF according their rates (i.e., banks with favorable rates contribute less, whereas banks with 
unfavorable rates contribute more). This system may impose alternative discipline mechanism on 
banks and compensate for the adverse effects of the distorted market discipline mechanism. 
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